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Abstract
Using the Logit quantal response form as the response function in each
step, the original definition of static quantal response equilibrium (QRE)
is extended into an iterative evolution process. QREs remain as the fixed
points of the dynamic process. However, depending on whether such fixed
points are the long-term solutions of the dynamic process, they can be
classified into stable (SQREs) and unstable (USQREs) equilibriums. This
extension resembles the extension from static Nash equilibriums (NEs) to
evolutionary stable solutions in the framework of evolutionary game the-
ory. The relation between SQREs and other solution concepts of games,
including NEs and QREs, is discussed. Using experimental data from
other published papers, we perform a preliminary comparison between
SQREs, NEs, QREs and the observed behavioral outcomes of those ex-
periments. For certain games, we determine that SQREs have better
predictive power than QREs and NEs.
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1 Introduction
Game theory has become a powerful and popular tool in many sociological
studies. Although several studies have questioned predictive power of the Nash
equilibrium (NE) [1, 2], it has been used as a primary game solution since its
initial proposition [3, 4]. However, the questions of finding such NEs and refining
them when multiple NEs exist are not easy tasks [5, 6]. Furthermore, people are
interested to know how, in experiments or real-life observations, one “preferred”
NE emerges from all possible strategy profiles, particularly in a population that
does not begin with a NE as the initial strategic state. This phenomenon is the
well-known question of learning in games and the converging towards particular
solutions [7, 8].
To find game solutions with predictive power, in addition to first searching
for all NEs and then refining them [9], dynamic processes have been proposed to
describe, mimic or reproduce to a certain extent the strategic thinking processes
of game players in the hope that certain long-term solutions of the dynamic pro-
cesses will lead to the “preferred” NEs [6, 10]. Well-known examples of such
dynamic process include replicator dynamics [11, 12, 13], Logit learning [14],
and fictitious play [15, 16]. In certain cases, a refined NE fits the experimental
data well. We refer to such an NE as the preferred NE. In this case, a pro-
posed evolutionary model is a good theory if the model predicts that long-term
solutions of the corresponding dynamic processes converge to the refined NE.
Alternatively, in other cases, no NE can explain the observed behavior in real
experiments. In this case, a good theory means that long-term solutions of the
proposed dynamic processes can explain the observed behavior instead of the
NEs [17]. To simplify our terminology, we denote both the NE and the long-
term solution in these cases, where they are capable of describing experimental
or real-life observations, the preferred NE. The primary goal of these typical dy-
namic processes, and thus of all of these theories, is to determine the preferred
NE by solving for the long-term solutions. For a dynamic process, usually two
central topics should be discussed: how well experimental observations can be
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explained by long-term solutions of the dynamic process and the relation be-
tween the dynamic process’s long-term solutions and other solution concepts
such as NEs and refined NEs.
In this manuscript, we study properties of a new dynamic process: the it-
erative Logit quantal response dynamics (ILQRD), which will be defined based
on the concept of static Quantal Response Equilibriums (QREs). Our goal of
proposing this new dynamic process is solely to capture the preferred NE with
long-term stable solutions of ILQRD, which we denote as stable QREs (SQREs).
This manuscript is organized as follows. In this introduction, we first ex-
plain our main idea: the evolutionary process. In section § 2, we define several
notations and the dynamic process. There, we also compare the new dynamic
process with other learning models and evolutionary processes in game theory.
In the rest parts of this manuscript, we attempt to discuss the two previously
introduced central topics of this ILQRD process: how the long-term solutions
fit experimental results and what is the relation between its long-term solution
and other solution concepts. In section § 3, we illustrate the performance of our
dynamic process using examples. In section § 4, we provide an analytical proof
of the major conclusions for the special cases of 2×2 symmetrical games. Then,
in section §5, we compare our SQRE with a highly similar solution concept:
the quantal response stable solutions (QRSS). In section § 6, using SQRE, we
re-analyze some collected experimental results. Finally, in section §7, we sum-
marize our main conclusions and discuss possible future recearch.
2 Notations and Definitions
To present our formula in a compact form and to remain consistent with the
notations and the terminology of statistical ensembles used in statistical physics
and quantum statistical physics, in this section, we introduce a matrix-based no-
tation to represent a generalN×M game. The key notation that differs from the
conventional mathematical forms of game theory is the matrix representation
of probability distributions and the payoff matrices of general N -player games.
One may proceed directly to Eq. (18) and Eq. (19) and continue from there
if learning these new notation presents an obstacle. Most of our expressions
can be understood in terms of the conventional mathematics of game theory.
However, we believe that they can be understood more conveniently using the
new notation. Furthermore, the new notation is readily applicable to quantum
games [18].
2.1 A new set of matrix-based notations
Here, we introduce a matrix-based notation for probability distributions such
that the probability distribution of the strategic status of all players and the
mathematical description of payoffs for games with an arbitrary number of play-
ers and an arbitrary number of strategies become matrices. However, to under-
stand our work in this manuscript, this new set of notation is not necessary.
3
One may skip this section and proceed directly to Eq. (18) and Eq. (19) in
§2.2.
Consider a 2 × 2 game with the following conventional form of payoff bi-
matrix:
G1,2 =
[
a, a
′
b, c
′
c, b
′
d, d
′
]
, (1)
with the convention that the row (column) strategies belong to the first (second)
player and the first (second) number of all entries represents the payoff received
by the first (second) player. We denote the first (second) player’s strategy
C,D (also C,D, although one player’s strategies can be totally different from
the other player’s strategies). Usually, mixed strategies, which include pure
strategies as special cases, are written as column vectors: For example,
P 1 =
[
p1, 1− p1
]T
(2)
for player 1 and
P 2 =
[
p2, 1− p2
]T
(3)
for player 2. The payoff is calculated from the following vector-matrix-vector
multiplication
E1,2 =
(
P 1
)T
G1,2P 2. (4)
For 2× 2 games, the payoff matrix G indeed appears as a matrix. However, for
a general N ×M game, the matrix becomes a map from N vectors to R, i.e. ,
cubic tensors for 3-player games and T (N, 0)-type tensors for N -player games.
The payoff is no longer a matrix.
To unify the notation of all N ×M games, we introduce a new equivalent
set of notations as follows. We write payoff matrices and mixed strategies as
matrices:
H1,2 =


a, a
′
0 0 0
0 b, c
′
0 0
0 0 c, b
′
0
0 0 0 d, d
′

 , (5)
and
ρ1,2 =
[
p1, p2 0
0
(
1− p1
)
,
(
1− p2
) ] . (6)
Then we calculate the payoff from the following trace operation:
E1,2 = tr
(
H1,2ρ1 ⊗ ρ2
)
. (7)
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One can confirm that with the same strategy profiles, Eq. (7) and Eq. (4)
result in the same payoffs. For the special case of the 2 × 2 game, in the new
formalism, the payoff matrices and the matrices of strategy state of all players
are of dimension 22. The probability distribution of both players is defined as
a direct product of each player’s state matrix:
ρ = ρ1 ⊗ ρ2. (8)
Every entry of this state matrix corresponds to the probability of all of the
players choosing the corresponding strategic combination defined by the position
of the entry. For example, the (1, 1) (upper-left) entry of ρ is p1p2 and means
that at this probability, the two players take the strategic combination (C,C).
In turn, the correspondence of this entry in the payoff matrices H1,2 – their
(1, 1) entries – are naturally
(
a, a
′
)
. In this sense, from the general expression,
Ei = tr
(
Hiρ1 ⊗ ρ2
)
≡ H
(
ρ1, ρ2
)
. (9)
Hi can be interpreted as a linear map from the set of
{(
ρ1, ρ2
)}
to real number
R.
Another useful feature of this notation system is that it streamlines the
description of correlated strategies. That is, this notation also functions when
ρ 6= ρ1⊗ρ2. For an N×M game, sil stands for the lth strategy of the ith player,
where i ∈ [1, N ] and l ∈ [1,M ]. The set of strategies of player i is denoted
as Si =
{
si1, s
i
2, · · · , s
i
M
}
. For convenience, we denote the set of probability
distributions over Si as ∆i, i.e. , ∆i =
{
ρi
}
and the direct product set of all
of these probability distributions as ∆, i.e. , ∆ = ∆1 ⊗ ∆2. This ∆ differs
from the set of probability distributions over S = S1 ⊗ S1, which we denote
as ∆ (S). This space includes the correlated strategy, whereas ∆ is the set of
only independent strategies. For example, in this notation, a general possibly
correlated equilibrium [19] can be defined as ρ12ce ∈ ∆(S) such that for every
player i, ∀ρi ∈ ∆i,
tr
(
Hiρ1,2ce
)
≥ tr
(
Hiρi ⊗ tri
(
ρ12ce
))
(10)
where tri
(
ρ1,2ce
)
is a partial trace, which performs the partial integral/summation
over player i’s strategy space. For example,
tr1
(
ρ12
)
=
∑
l
ρ12
(
s1l , ·
)
(11)
and the result is a strategy profile of player 2. This partial trace is the same as
the partial summation in deriving partial distribution in probability theory. In
our notation, NE is defined as ρ1ne ⊗ ρ
2
ne or, equivalently, ρ
12
ne ∈ ∆ such that for
∀i, ∀ρi,
tr
(
Hiρ1ne ⊗ ρ
2
ne
)
≥ tr
(
Hiρi ⊗ tri
(
ρ1ne ⊗ ρ
2
ne
))
. (12)
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2.2 Definition of iterative Logit quantal response dynam-
ics (ILQRD) and its stable equilibriums
Using the previously described matrix-based notation, for a 2-player game our
iterative Logit quantal response dynamics (ILQRD) is defined as follows:
ρ1 (t+ 1) =
1
Z1R (t)
eβH
1
R(ρ2(t)), (13)
ρ2 (t+ 1) =
1
Z2R (t+ 1)
eβH
2
R(ρ
1(t+1)), (14)
where the reduced payoff matrix is defined as
H1R
(
ρ2
)
= H1
(
·, ρ2
)
, (15)
H2R
(
ρ1
)
= H2
(
ρ1, ·
)
. (16)
Normalization constant ZiR is defined as
ZiR = tr
(
eβH
i
R
)
. (17)
Using the matrix-based notations, one can straightforwardly extend this ILQRD
to general N ×M games.
Using the usual notation of probability distribution, for the 2 × 2 game
defined in Eq. (1), Eq. (2) and Eq. (3), we can rewrite the iteration process
explicitly as follows:
p1(t+ 1) =
eβ(ap
2(t)+b(1−p2(t)))
eβ(ap
2(t)+b(1−p2(t))) + eβ(cp2(t)+d(1−p2(t)))
, (18)
p2(t+ 1) =
e
β
(
a
′
p1(t+1)+b
′
(1−p2(t+1))
)
eβ(a
′
p1(t+1)+b′(1−p1(t+1))) + eβ(c
′
p1(t+1)+d′ (1−p1(t+1)))
(19)
To simplify our notation, we denote the RHS of Eq. (18) as g (p;β | a, b, c, d),
where a, b, c and d can be omitted when it is clear what the parameter a, b, c
and d refers to. Formally, we denote this map as
p2 (t+ 1) = φ
(
p2(t)
)
= g
(
g
(
p2(t);β | a, b, c, d
)
;β | a
′
, b
′
, c
′
, d
′
)
(20)
and p1 (t+ 1) can be regarded as an intermediate variable. This map is an
iterative map from a mixed strategy (p2(t)) to a new mixed strategy (p2(t+1)).
The fixed points of this ILQRD are the same as the static Logit QRE, and
they are denoted as ρ∗ (β) =
(
p1
∗
(β) , p2
∗
(β)
)
. If a fixed point of those QREs is
also the long-term evolution of ILQRD, this fixed point is referred to as a stable
QRE (SQRE) and denoted as ρ∞ (β) =
(
p1
∞
(β) , p2
∞
(β)
)
. Otherwise, it will
be referred to as an unstable QRE (USQRE). Next, we focus on the relations
among pure-strategy NEs, mixed NEs, QREs and SQREs and experimental
data. A SQRE must be a QRE. However, the inverse is not necessary true.
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This stability test potentially differentiates QREs into SQREs and USQREs.
In principle, such differentiation can improve the predictive power of QREs for
experimental data and examing/demonstrating this is the whole point of the
present manuscript.
2.3 Difference between our evolutionary process and other
learning/imitating models
In ILQRD, a key concept is the use of the quantal response function (as in
Eq. (13) and Eq. (14)) to determine a player’s strategy profile according to the
player’s corresponding payoffs. The introduction of parameter β as a description
of bounded rationality in this form of quantal response function is common in
theories of learning in games [20] and in the QRE concept [21]. Additionally,
this idea may be proposed simply from the viewpoint of statistical physics [18].
The use of parameter β can be justified to a certain degree based on games with
limited information [22, 23].
In fact, the same expression used in Eq. (13) and Eq. (14) has been used
in discussions of Logit QRE, and a highly similar expression has been used in
Logit learning [24, 14], stochastic fictitious play [15] and stochastic reinforcement
learning [25]. In these theories, the quantal response function, as in Eq. (13) and
Eq. (14), is occasionally referred to as the smoothed best response. However,
all of these theories differ from ours in principle, as explained bellow.
First, we compare our expressions with the QRE. In the QRE,
p
(
si
)
=
eβu
(i)(si,p−i)∑
ri∈Si e
βu(i)(ri,p−i)
(21)
is a map from all players’ strategy profile p = Π ⊗ pi to itself. This equation
is a fixed-point equation. Our work differs from the QRE in that a QRE only
focuses on fixed points solved from static equations, whereas we use iterations
to find the stable fixed points and distinguish them from other, unstable fixed
points. Later, we will note that such a difference in stability is essential in
applying the QRE to explaining experiments.
The QRE has been compared with experimental observation and generally
provides a better fit to the data than a NE [26]. However, the QRE has been crit-
icized as an illusory improvement because there is an additional free parameter
in QRE when fitting the curve, and one can always improve using an addi-
tional parameter. We demonstrate that this free parameter is not completely
free. In fact, in certain cases, when the β is sufficiently large, the fixed points
from the QRE are no longer stable. Therefore, when comparing experimental
data with the stable/unstable QREs and the NEs, one can determine whether
the QRE or the NE has more predictive power. Distinguishing stable QREs
from unstable QREs using iterative dynamics is this manuscript’s first contri-
bution. As presented below, we collected experimental data and conducted a
preliminary comparison of the theories with experimental observations. After
distinguishing SQREs from QREs, we tested SQREs, QREs and NEs against
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several experiments reported in the literature, which is this manuscript’s second
contribution. One possible further investigation along this line, which has not
been implimented in this work, can be applying our ILQRD to cross-game ex-
periments. For example, using the same players in different games with similar
level of payoffs, we can estimate the parameter β from one game and test it in
other games.
In a dynamic QRE [24], so-called Logit learning [14], which is driven by
observations during real game-playing processes, in which each player chooses
only one pure strategy to play every turn, the same smoothed best response
function is used to mimic the player’s response to the opponent’s pure strategy,
as follows:
p
(
si, s−i
)
=
eβu
(i)(si,s−i)∑
ri∈Si e
βu(i)(ri,s−i)
. (22)
In fact, this smoothed best response function defines a probability transition
matrix between the current strategy profiles of player i and the previous strategy
profiles of all of the other players. This transition probability depends not on
player i’s previous state si (t− 1) but on the previous states of all of the other
players s−i (t− 1). For simplicity, we express this probability as follows:
M (i)
(
s−i (t)
)
=
[
p
(
si, s−i (t)
)]
M×M
. (23)
If we let each player take his or her turn in the natural order, we will have a
transition matrix between the current and the previous strategy profiles of all
of the players. For simplicity, we denote this matrix as
M = ΠNi=1M
(i). (24)
In the abovr formula, taking N = 2 as example, the matrix may be written
according to one of the two following rules:
M =M (1)
(
s−1 (t− 1)
)
M (2)
(
s−2 (t)
)
, (25)
M =M (1)
(
s−1 (t− 1)
)
M (2)
(
s−2 (t− 1)
)
. (26)
The first rule is referred to as alternating updating, whereas the second rule
is referred to as simultaneous updating. Regardless of the form assumed, the
central task is to determine the invariant probability distribution using the
transition matrix M :
Pss = lim
n→∞
(
MT
)n
P0. (27)
To distinguish fixed-point solutions of this transition matrix from a QRE, these
long-term solutions are occasionally referred to as end results of Logit response
dynamics [14]. Here, we name such solutions quantal response stable solutions
(QRSSs). There have been many attempts to solve [27] or characterize [14] such
a QRSS (Pss) for a given transition matrixM . Because a QRE and a QRSS use
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similar formulae, in principle, the two should be closely related. For example,
a QRSS could be a subset of QREs and thus expected to be a somehow refined
one from the entire set of QREs. In a sense, the stable solutions of our ILQRD
also capture the stable portion of QREs. Therefore, in principle, our SQREs
should be closely related to a QRSS. However, in section §5 we demonstrate
that it is generally not the case: QRSSs differ substantially from QREs and
SQREs. Differentiating a QRSS from a QRE and a SQRE is this manuscript’s
third contribution.
Next, we focus on a comparison between ILQRD and fictitious play [15]. In
fictitious play, players update their beliefs and choose a pure strategy to play
according to certain decision-making rules that relate their strategy choice to
their beliefs. Such decision-making rules typically include, for example, the best
response myopic strategy [15] and the smoothed best response [28]. The latter
uses the same expression as used in Eq. (21) with only one difference. The differ-
ence is, p−i, which is the true current strategy profiles of the others, is replaced
by player i’s belief regarding the strategy profiles of the others, which is usually
taken to be the empirical distribution deduced from the entire history of other
players’ choices. In Eq. (21), Eq. (13) and Eq. (14), there is no belief and no
empirical distribution. When we examine the learning process in real life, it may
seem to be more reasonable to take player beliefs into consideration. However,
as we have previously noted, we are substantially much concerned about find-
ing the proper solutions, that is, solutions capable of predicting experimental
behavioral outcomes, than making the entire dynamic process meaningful. Be-
cause fictitious play extracts the empirical distribution of other player strategy
profiles from history, the speed of convergence occasionally becomes a problem
[29, 30]. As discussed below, in ILQRD, convergence speed is never an issue.
Similar relation holds bewteen ILQRD and stochastic reinforcement learning
[25]. A record of scores for every potential strategy is kept by every player in
the reinforcement learning while here in the ILQRD, only the previous mixed
strategy is used in the decision making of the current strategy.
Another widely used dynamic process to determine the preferred NE is repli-
cator dynamics [12, 13]. All such previously mentioned learning-based mapping
or dynamics differ from replicator dynamics, where each player plays against
a finite or infinite population and individuals learn from simple imitation but
not with individual introspective thinking. In this manuscript, we focus on the
effects of introspective thinking and only of the two players but not in a model
of population dynamics.
We should note that the same notion of ILQRD (referred to as Boltzmann
iteration) was proposed in a 2004 unpublished working paper [18] by one of the
authors in a quantum game context. The idea is not a central topic in that
working paper and was not developed any further there.
Additionall, a highly similar dynamic process was proposed in [31], as a
concept referred to as noisy rational strategies (NRS):
ρnrs = lim
n→∞
φβ0 ◦ φβ1 ◦ · · · ◦ φβn (ρ (0)) . (28)
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There, the authors focus on the effect of increasing β (β0 ≤ β1 ≤ · · · ≤ βn) and
assume β∞ =∞ so that ρ (0) becomes irrelevant. According to the authors, such
an increase in β can be interpreted as the increasing difficulty of performing a
greater number of iterations given a player’s finite capability [31]. In this sense,
what we discuss in this paper bears a greater resemblance to the following:
ρ2sqre = lim
n→∞
φβn ◦ · · · ◦ φβ2 ◦ φβ1
(
ρ2 (0)
)
, (29)
with a constant β, i.e. , βl = β. We do not assume that β is increasing or
decreasing, or that β∞ = ∞ or β1 = ∞. We do not believe that it is more
difficult to perform more iterations because all iteration processes are supposed
to be fictitious. We will demonstrate that essentially none of the desired features
of SQRE rely on details concerning orders of β or increasing or decreasing values
of β, instead depending on iteration. The iteration alone suffices to lead us to
the preferred NE. Furthermore, we have not found a thorough discussion of the
stability of NRS solutions. Thus, this manuscript can be regarded as a further
development of the NRS in that it distinguishes stable from unstable solutions
and notes that the key component is the iteration and not the order of β or the
assumption of the limit of βn approaching ∞.
In sum, the proposed interative process differs from many other theories
in that it is a map from a mixed strategy of all of the players to a new mixed
strategy of all of the players. One might have some questions with respect to the
interpretation of this process and comparison with real game playing. However,
in physics, it is natural to study the evolution of distribution functions directly
instead of the evolution of individual trajectories. Additionally, we do not aim
at making the process reflect to realty more closely, but only to make the long-
term solution more capable of predicting the game outcomes. Next, we discuss
certain features of the proposed iterative process and compare its solutions to
observed behavioral outcomes of experiments.
3 Major features of ILQRD, illustrated through
examples
In this section, first, we demonstrate by example that the QRE covers all NEs,
including pure and mixed NEs. This conclusion is not new and has been im-
plicitly demonstrated in [26]. For a 2 × 2 game, this statement can be proved
by considering Eq. (18) and Eq. (19) in the extreme case of β → ∞. We
present a general proof in section §4. Second, we demonstrate that once there
is a preferred pure NE in a game, our SQRE converges to this focal NE. This
phenomenon serves as a natural refinement. Unfortunately, we have not proved
this conclusion mathematically. Thus, we illustrate this outcome by examples.
Third, we demonstrate that all QREs that correspond to mixed NEs are not
stable for the case of large β (β → ∞) but that some of these QREs can be
stable for finite β. The third conclusion first questions the predictive power
of QREs (when they correspond to mixed NEs) and then redeems the QRE
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as a possibly applicable solution when bounded rationality is considered. This
conclusion also distinguishes stable QREs from unstable QREs, which enables
examination of the applicability of QREs to the explanation of experimental
observations or real-life phenomena. That is, in principle, it is no longer true
that QREs are strictly better than NEs. If the experimental data of a game
are located in the region of unstable QREs, the QRE is not a practical solution
concept for the game because unstable solutions are not reachable following the
evolution. As far as we know, the last two conclusions (first, that SQREs con-
verge to preferred NEs when there are such NEs and thus it represent a natural
refinement of NEs and, second, QREs that correspond to mixed NEs become
unstable for large enough β) are new. This also implies that mixed NE are not
directly applicable, since they are in a sense always unstable in the limit of large
β (also according to best-response dynamics), unless these mixed NEs are close
to SQREs. We believe this also improves our understanding of mixed NEs.
3.1 Games with two pure NEs and a mixed NE: Coordi-
nation Game and Hawk-Dove Game
It can be demonstrated that for games with a dominant strategy, such as the
prisoner’s dilemma, the dominant strategy is such that one of the QREs and the
SQRE converge toward the dominant strategy in the large β limit. However, this
case is trivial. We demonstrate behaviors of our ILQRD starting from the more
interesting coordination game, which does not have any dorminant strategies.
The payoff matrices of coordination game are as follows:
G1,2 =
[
1, 1 0, 0
0, 0 5, 5
]
. (30)
It is known that there are two pure-strategy NEs and a mixed NE. They are(
p1, p2
)
= (0, 0) , (1, 1) , (0.83, 0.83), which are denoted respectively as PNE00,PNE11
and MNE. Conventionally, the preferred NE — PNE00 — of this game can be
found to be the focal NE through refinement [5, 6]. Evolutionary stability anal-
ysis [11] indicates that the mixed NE is unstable. That is, when p10 < p
1
c = 0.83
(p10 > p
1
c), the population converges to PNE00 (PNE11). Because the β we
introduced has no absolute meaning, in all of the manuscript’s remaining cal-
culations, we normalize each player’s payoffs by their own maximum. For the
payoffs provided in Eq. (30), the maximums are 5 and 5 for the first and second
player, respectively.
Fig.1 shows iterative mappings for a range of values of β of this coordina-
tion game. Each curve except the red curve (which is p1 = p1) is a curve of
the iterative mapping for a given value of β. The long arrow labeled β ↑ in-
dicates the shift of the curve of the iterative mapping when β increases. As
an example, we also illustrate the first two steps of the iterative process for a
specific value of β = 3.1. Usually it takes only less than 20 iterations to find the
SQREs with reasonable accuracy starting from any initial value of p1. We can
observe that for small β, there is only one QRE, which corresponds to PNE00
11
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0.0
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0.4
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Figure 1: The iterative mapping for various β and the line of p1 = p1 on the
coordination game. For a given value of β, the intersections of corresponding
curve and the line of p1 = p1 are the QREs. For this game, there is only one
QRE for small values of β, whereas there are three QREs(QRE00, QRE11 and
QREMNE) for larger β. Here, QRE00 and QRE11 are always stable, whereas
QREMNE , which is close to p
1 = 0.83, is always unstable. As an example,
we illustrate the first two steps of the iterative process for a specific value of
β = 3.1.
(denoted as QRE00). For large β, there are multiple QREs: QRE00, a QRE
that corresponds to PNE11 (denoted as QRE11) and a QRE that corresponds
to MNE (QREMNE). However, not all of these QREs are equally good. One
can observe that for this game QRE00 and QRE11 are always stable, whereas
QREMNE is always unstable. Here, stability means that if the initial guess is
not correct at the QRE, one iteration step will drive the value of p1 closer to
the QRE. Those QREs that are stable in this sense are referred to as SQRE.
To simplify our terminology, we will refer to the QREs that correspond to pure
(mixed) NEs in the limit of β →∞ as pure (mixed) QREs, although all QREs
for all finite β are in fact mixed strategies. The same naming scheme and the
same notation are used for SQREs, for instance, pure SQRE00, pure SQRE11
and mixed SQREMNE .
In principle, all of the information on the QREs and SQREs of this game is
included in Fig. 1. However, to better illustrate the stability of QREs, in Fig.
2, we plot the dependence on β of the stability of the QREs of the coordination
game . From the lower left section, where QRE00 overlaps with SQRE00, we
can observe that for small β (β < βc, which here is approximately 22), there
is only one QRE, and it is a SQRE. For all initial values of p1, this SQRE
is the only long-term state. When β > βc, there are three QREs: QRE00,
QRE11 and QREMNE . However, QREMNE is unstable. For initial values
of p10 less than the unstable QRE (the green line, QREMNE), the iteration
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Figure 2: Dependence on β of SQREs of the coordination game. When β <
βc, which here is approximately 22, there is only one QRE(QRE00) and it is
a SQRE. When β > βc, there are three QREs. However, the QREMNE is
unstable. For initial values of p10 less than the p
1 of QREMNE (the green line),
the iteration results in the QRE00 (the pink square; thus, SQRE00 in this case).
Otherwise, the QRE11 becomes the long-term solution of the iteration SQRE11
(the gold circle). The corresponding p2 (not shown) can be straightforwardly
calculated.
results in SQRE00(the pink line). Otherwise SQRE11(the blue line) becomes
the iteration’s long-term solution. The corresponding p2 (not shown in the
figure) can be straightforwardly calculated using Eq. (19). Note from the upper
right section that the region between SQRE11 (the blue line) and QREMNE
(the green line) is narrow compared with the space between SQRE00 (the blue
line) and QREMNE (the green line). This outcome indicates that for a wide
range of initial value of p1 the SQRE of this game converges toward SQRE00,
which is also PNE00, the preferred NE in this game. This picture, particularly
the right half of Fig. 2, is highly similar to results from evolutionary stability
analysis. However, the behavior with small β such that no matter what the
initial value of p1 is the SQRE is always the QRE that corresponds to PNE00,
is a unique result of our ILQRD. We believe that this unique SQRE for small β
can be regarded as a refinement of NEs.
In this game, we observe that QREs cover all NEs and that for a wide
range of initial values of p1, SQRE00 is the SQRE, and it corresponds to the
preferred NE (p1 = 0). Particularly when β < βc for all values of p
1
0, the
preferred NE is the only SQRE. It is intuitive to expect that even for large
β the green line (QREMNE) is closer to the blue line (QRE11) than the pink
line (QRE00). Thus, for a wide range of p
1
0, SQRE00 will be the long-term
solution of the iterative process. In this sense, ILQRD and its SQRE represent
a natural refinement for QREs and NEs. Additionally, we note that for this
game, overall, our prediction is somewhat similar to that of evolutionary stability
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analysis. Next, we discuss another game, in which our prediction differs more
significantly from the results of evolutionary stability analysis than the situation
in this Coordination Game.
Now, we consider the hawk-dove game, which according to evolutionary
game analysis [11] has one evolutionary stable mixed NE and two evolutionary
unstable pure NEs. Its payoff matrices are defined as follows:
G1,2 =
[
0, 0 7, 2
2, 7 6, 6
]
. (31)
Based on a calculation of iterative mappings similar to that shown in Fig. 1,
the QREs and SQREs of the hawk-dove game for various values of β are plotted
in Fig. 3. We observe that for small β, there is only one QRE(QREMNE) and
it is a SQRE. This SQRE is the long-term solution of the ILQRD for all of
the initial values of p1. For large β, there are three QREs: QRE01, QRE10 and
QREMNE . However, in this case,QREMNE is unstable. The long-term solution
of the ILQRD depends on the initial values of p1. When the initial values is
above p1 of QREMNE (the green line), QRE10 is the SQRE. Otherwise, QRE01
is the SQRE. This figure provides more information than the QREs and NEs by
distinguishing stable QREs from unstable ones. Additionally, this figur differs
from the results of the evolutionary stability analysis, which demonstrates that
the mixed NE of this game is evolutionary stable. Our results suggest that it is
stable only when β < βc, which is approximately 10 for this game. Otherwise,
the outcome of this game will prefer to be QRE01 or QRE10. This outcome
differs from the results of evolutionary game analysis of the same game. For
small β, the QREMNE is the only SQRE, whereas for large β, the mixed QRE
becomes unstable: depending on the initial value of p1, different SQREs can be
reached.
3.2 Games with a unique mixed NE: Tennis Game
The third example is the tennis game [32], which has one mixed NE
(
p1, p2
)
=
(0.7, 0.6) but no pure NEs. The payoff matrices are given as follows,
G1,2 =
[
5, 5 8, 2
9, 1 2, 8
]
. (32)
Both the QRE and SQRE are shown in Fig. 4. We find that for this game
there is always one and only one QRE for a given value of β and that this QRE
converges toward the mixed NE (0.7, 0.6) in the limit of β → ∞. Therefore,
this QRE is QREMNE . However, the SQRE follows this QREMNE only when
β is small enough (β ≤ βc, which for this game is approximately 3.7). When
β > βc, this QREMNE becomes unstable; thus, there is no longer any SQRE.
This game displays a substantial difference between the SQRE and the mixed
NEs. Such games can be used to test the applicability of SQRE relative to NE,
as shown in the following section.
From these examples, we observed the following: first, QREs exist for all of
the games discussed above, and QREs cover all of the NEs in the limit of β →∞;
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Figure 3: QREs and SQRE of the hawk-dove Game. When β < βc, which is
approximately 10 for this game, starting from an arbitrary initial value of p1,
the long-term solution of the ILQRD of the hawk-dove Game is SQREMNE .
When β > βc, there are three QREs: QRE01, QRE10 and QREMNE . However,
here, QREMNE is unstable. In this case, the SQRE depends on the initial
values of p1: When it is above p1 of SQREMNE (the green line), it is SQRE10
(pink square). Otherwise, it is SQRE01 (the gold circle).
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Figure 4: NEs, QRE and SQRE of the tennis game. From (a), we observe
that there is only one QRE (QREMNE : the green line) for each given value of
β. There is one SQRE (SQREMNE : the green circle) when β < βc, which is
approximately 3.7 for this game, and there is no SQRE for β > βc. (b) shows
the plots of p1 and p2 and their relation with β. The green curve of triangles
represents values of
(
p1, p2
)
when such divergent iterations are performed 1000
times. We observe again that when β > βc, QREMNE can not be reached by
any SQREs, although it converges towards the NE.
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second, for games with a preferred NE, the SQRE can be used as a refinement
of the NEs; and finally, mixed QREs become unstable for large enough β values;
thus, the SQRE can be regarded as a refinement of the QREs (and therefore the
NEs). These observations reflect the three main features of our ILQRD. As we
pointed earlier, the first feature was implicitly demonstrated in [26]. However,
the latter two features are new. For certain games, the distance between the
SQRE and the mixed NE is large. Thus, experimental results on such games are
suitable for testing the applicability of the SQRE relative to the NE. Before we
proceed to a comparison of our theoretical prediction with experimental results,
we prove the previously mentioned first and the third features of our ILQRD.
Unfortunately, we cannot prove the second feature because at present we do not
know the necessary and sufficient condition for a game to have a preferred NE.
Instead, we simply desire to demonstrate that for the coordination game and the
hawk-dove game, for small β, the SQRE corresponds to a certain refinement:
SQRE00 for the former game[5, 6] and SQREMNE for the latter [11].
4 Proof of main conclusions on 2× 2 symmetric
games
In this section, while considering a symmetric game for simplicity, we wish to
prove the previously described three features using examples.
Let a
′
= a, b
′
= b, c
′
= c, d
′
= d in Eq. (13) and Eq. (14). If we merge the
two equation and focus only on p1, the iteration function becomes
p1 (t+ 1) =
1
1 + e
β
[
(c−d−a+b)
(
1
1+e
β[(c−d−a+b)p1(t)+d−b]
)
+d−b
] , f (p1 (t) ;β) .
(33)
First, there are five possible NEs: the pure NEs (0, 0) , (1, 0) , (0, 1) , (1, 1) and
a mixed NE
(
b−d
c−d−a+b ,
c−d
c−d−a+b
)
, depending on the values of a, b, c and d. Let
us first demonstrate that the QREs cover all of the NEs under proper condi-
tional relations among a, b, c and d. That is Eq. (33) has five possible solutions:
QRE00 (β), QRE10 (β), QRE01 (β), QRE11 (β) and QREMNE (β), which cor-
responds to the previously mentioned five NEs in the limit of β →∞. In terms
of these notations, we wish to demonstrate that

QRE00 (β) if b − d < 0 & c− a > 0
QRE00 (β) & QRE11 (β) if b − d < 0 & c− a < 0
QRE10 (β) & QRE01 (β) if b − d > 0 & c− a > 0
QRE11 (β) if b − d > 0 & c− a < 0
QREMNE (β) if 0 <
b−d
b−d+c−a < 1
. (34)
We will prove that the first and the last cases and the extensions to other cases
are trivial.
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It is straightforward to demonstrate that when b− d < 0 & c− a > 0,
f (0;β) > 0 and lim
β→∞
f (0;β) = 0 and 0 < lim
β→∞
∂f (0;β)
∂p
< 1. (35)
These three conditions mean that f(0;β) is always greater than 0. However,
it approaches more closly to 0 when β increases. Additionally, when β is suf-
ficiently large, f(p;β) increases near p = 0. However, it increases slower than
p1. This statement is equivalent to stating that f (0;β)− 0 > 0, and there is a
p¯ such that f (p¯;β) − p¯ < 0 when β is sufficiently large. Thus, there must be a
p∗ (β), such that f (p∗;β)− p∗ = 0. In the limit of β →∞ such p∗ (β) = 0. The
situation for p2 can be analyzed similarly.
For QREMNE , where 0 < p
∗ = b−d
b−d+c−a < 1 is a proper mixed strategy, we
first want to demonstrate that
lim
β→∞
f (p∗;β) = p∗ and lim
β→∞
∂f (p;β)
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p∗
− 1 6= 0. (36)
If we can prove this point, then, first, p∗ is a fixed point in the limit of β →
∞. Second, this fixed point is not a maximum or minimum of the function
f (p;β) − p. The latter means that the curve f (p;β) − p passes across 0 when
β is sufficiently large and 0 is not an extremum.
Because we are working with symmetric games, the iteration function f (p;β)
can be regarded as a composite mapping of the following function:
f (p;β) = g (g (p;β) ;β) = g ◦ g, (37)
where
g (p;β) =
1
1 + eβ[(c−d−a+b)p(t)+d−b]
. (38)
In terms of this function, we can then easily demonstrate that
lim
β→∞
g (p∗;β) = p∗ and lim
β→∞
∂g (p;β)
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p∗
− 1 6= 0. (39)
Here, we discuss the first part in greater detail, whereas the remainder is
straightforward. The fixed point of the mapping g is defined equivalently as
follows:
p =
1
β
ln
(
1
p
− 1
)
+ b− d
c− d− a+ b
(40)
For p (t) that is close enough to p∗ such that 0 < p (t) < 1, the limit of the RHS
of Eq. (40) when β →∞ becomes exactly p∗.
Up to this point, we have demonstrated that the QREs of Eq. (33) cover
all of the possible pure strategy NEs and the mixed NEs. Next, we discuss
their stability. We wish to demonstrate that any pure QREs if exist are always
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SQREs and that mixed QREs are SQREs only for small β but unstable for large
β. Additionally, we attempt to define βc, the critical value of β.
Stable solutions are a subset of fixed points. For the iterative mapping
defined in Eq. (33), we use linear stability analysis [33], according to which a
solution of Eq. (33) is stable if the Jacobian (simply a derivative in this case)
of the right-hand side is less than 1, i.e. ,
∂f
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p∗
= [β (c− d− a+ b)]
2
(1− p∗ (β))
2
(p∗ (β))
2
< 1, (41)
where p∗ (β) is defined as in
p∗ = f (p∗;β) . (42)
For pure QREs, for example, QRE00, p
∗ (β) decreases to 0 exponentially as
1
1+eβ(d−b)
. Therefore, βp∗ (β) → 0. Thus, Eq. (41) is always satisfied. Other
pure QREs can similarly be shown to be stable. Thus, all of them are SQREs.
For mixed QREs, first consider the case of β = 0. In this case, the payoff
makes no difference. therefore, p∗ (β = 0) = 12 , and thus
∂f
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p∗
= 0 < 1, (43)
Therefore, mixed QREs are SQREs in the limit of β → 0. Now, consider the
case of β → ∞. Because 0 < p∗ (β) < 1 is a finite number, there is always a
βc such that when β > βc, Eq. (41) is no longer valid. βc, which is the critical
value of β, is defined as follows:
[βc (c− d− a+ b)]
2
(1− p∗ (βc))
2
(p∗ (βc))
2
= 1, (44)
For a given game with fixed values of a, b, c and d, the numerical value of βc can
be solved numerically using Eq. (42) and Eq. (44) together. In Fig. 5, we plot
all βc found in numerical simulation of ILQRD (denoted as β
N
c ) against the βc
solved from Eq. (42) and Eq. (44) (denoted as βTc ). We found that the two
values agree with each other well.
For asymmetric games, similar βc can be derived. For simplicity, let us define
C (p∗, βc; a, b, c, d) ≡ βc (c− d− a+ b) (1− p
∗ (βc)) p
∗ (βc). Then, the critical
value of β is determined by∣∣C (p1,∗, βc; a, b, c, d)C (p2,∗, βc; a′, b′, c′, d′)∣∣ = 1, (45)
p1,∗ = g
(
p2,∗;βc | a, b, c, d
)
, (46)
p2,∗ = g
(
p1,∗;βc | a
′, b′, c′, d′
)
. (47)
for all the examples used in the previous section and also those payoff matrices of
the experiments discussed in the next section, we plot βc, which are numerically
solved from these equations and the corresponding ones found from simulations.
We found that values of βc numerically solved and values found from simulations
are in very good agreement.
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Figure 5: For all of the games discussed above and below βNc , which is the βc
found in iterative calculation, is plotted against βTc , the βc which is solved.
We have demonstrated that for symmetric 2× 2 games, our ILQRD has the
following characteristics: (1) the QREs cover all of the pure and mixed NEs,
and (2) pure QREs are SQREs, whereas mixed QREs are SQREs for small
β but unstable for sufficiently large β. These conclusions cover all the major
features that we demonstrated in the preceding section using specific examples.
A general proof for general 2 × 2 games should be straightforward, although it
would involve more tedious algebra.
From this general proof, we have observe that for all of the values of β, the
QRE exists but not the SQRE. Intuitively, when β increases, the QREs approach
NEs because our iteration process moves closer to the best response dynamics.
However, QREs might lose their stability when β is sufficiently large. The
difference between the SQRE and the NE depends on the competition between
these two effects: approaching NE and losing stability. This difference provides
a means of examining the applicability of the QRE. The QRE has been criticized
because the fixed points, which are what we refer to as QREs, can always surpass
mixed the NE as a result of the free parameter β. We agree with this statement.
Therefore, that experimental data are closer to the QREs than the mixed NEs
does not imply that the QRE is a better solution concept than the NE. However,
this criticism does not hold for our SQRE, which loses its stability for larger β,
indicating that our SQRE cannot always outperform mixed NEs. By assessing
whether the experimental data points are closer to our SQRE than the mixed
NEs, we can compare the SQRE solution concept with the NE(section §6).
5 Difference between QRSS and SQRE
QRSS, which is occasionally referred to as Logit response dynamics [14, 27],
starts from an arbitrary strategy profile for each player and then uses the tran-
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sition matrix defined in Eq. (22) to evolve the strategic states of all of the
players into the invariant distribution defined in Eq. (27). Its stationary states
have been discussed by several researchers. However, there is no full study on
the necessary and sufficient conditions of the convergence of the QRSS to NE
[14, 24, 27]. In this section, we demonstrate that although Eq. (22) appears
similar to Eq. (21), Pss as defined in Eq. (27) differs substantially from ρ∞ (β).
As discussed below, the difference is that Pss is a distribution in ∆ (S) which
is the set of all of the possible distribution functions on S, whereas ρ∞ (β) is a
member of ∆, which is the set of independent distribution functions. That is,
Pss includes possibly correlated strategies, whereas ρ∞ (β) describes only purely
non-cooperative strategies.
Now, we demonstrate this statement using one example: a 2× 2 symmetric
game with payoff matrices [14]:
G1,2 =
[
1, 1 0, 0
0, 0 1, 1
]
. (48)
This game is a potential game [14]. It has two strict NEs and a proper mixed
NE. According to [14] and [27], the corresponding Logit response dynamics has
an invariant distribution of strategy profiles that correspond to the potential
maximizer and the proper mixed NE. Here, we show that the invariant distribu-
tion in fact does not correspond to the proper mixed NE. It involves correlations
between players. First, we calculate the probability transition matrix M and
then obtain the Pss of this game according Eq. (27). From the Pss, we find the
reduced strategy profile P 1 for player 1 and P 2 for player 2:
P 1
(
s1l
)
=
∑
m
Pss
(
s1l , s
2
m
)
, P 2
(
s2m
)
=
∑
l
Pss
(
s1l , s
2
m
)
. (49)
Then, we define the correlation index as
C =
∑
l,m
[
Pss
(
s1l , s
2
m
)
− P 1
(
s1l
)
P 2
(
s2m
)]2
. (50)
The correlation index is zero when the joint distribution Pss is a product of
two independent probability distributions. Otherwise, it is nonzero and vice
versa. In Fig.6, we plot the correlation index C calculated for the QRSS. We
find that the correlation index of the QRSS is always non-zero except in cases
of extremely small β values. It is obvious that the SQRE is uncorrelated and
that the correlation index remains 0. In fact, the joint distribution is defined
for the SQRE in this manner.
In this paper, we have not yet discussed the applicability of correlated strate-
gies in non-cooperative games [19] and will not address it. However, we have
noted that the invariant distribution of the QRSS or Logit response dynamics
generally result in correlated strategies and the QRSS differs from the QRE and
the SQRE.
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Figure 6: Correlation index C obtained from QRSS plotted against β. The
correlation index of the QRSS is always non-zero except, again, in cases of
extremely small β.
6 Experimental results re-analyzed using ILQRD
As previously explained, a key difference between this manuscript and other
studies on the QRE is that beyond certain values of β, QRE becomes unstable.
Therefore, even when the experimental data are better fit by the QRE, if the
data is near the unstable region, then applicability of the QRE is questionable.
In this section, we examine how close the experimental data are to SQRE.
We focus on experiments that involve 2 × 2 games with unique mixed NE and
require the games to have a SQRE relatively distant from such mixed NE, i.e. ,
games such as the one in Fig.4. Erev et al. [34] conducted forty 2× 2 constant
sum games. Each pair of players played one game 500 times. Among these
experimental games, there were ten games in which each game was played by
nine pairs of subjects, whereas the other thirty games were played by one pair
of subjects. Here, we use only experimental data from the ten games played by
nine subject pairs. The payoff matrices of the ten games are shown in Table
1, which is reproduced from Table 1 in [34]. The sixth column shows the NE
of each game. Each player was asked to choose between A and B. The payoff
entry AB presents player 1’s wining probability (×100) when the player choose
A and the player’s opponent choose B and so on. The payoff for each win was
4 cents. All ten games were played by fixed pairs for 500 trials. Table 2 shows
the proportion of A choices in the 500 trials by each player. We would have
preferred the data from the 500 pairs of independent players to the data from
the games repeated 500 times by the same pair of players. However, first, we
did not find such data, and second, for this constant-sum game, it is believed
that a repeated game produces no surprising result. For social dilemma games,
such as the prisoner’s dilemma, of which when the game is repeated even a finite
number of times, the experimental behavioral outcome completely changes.
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Table 1: Payoff matrix of ten game samples
Game AA AB BA BB NE (p1, p2)
1 77 35 8 48 (0.4878,0.1585)
2 73 74 87 20 (0.9853,0.7941)
3 63 8 1 17 (0.2253,0.1268)
4 55 75 73 60 (0.3939,0.4545)
5 5 64 93 40 (0.4732,0.2143)
6 46 54 61 23 (0.8261,0.6739)
7 89 53 82 92 (0.2174,0.8478)
8 88 38 40 55 (0.2308,0.2615)
9 40 76 91 23 (0.6538,0.5096)
10 69 5 13 33 (0.2381,0.3333)
Table 2: The proportion of A choices in 500 trials by each of the players.
Game p1 p2
1 0.591 0.318
2 0.84 0.36
3 0.583 0.222
4 0.274 0.502
5 0.378 0.32
6 0.638 0.41
7 0.295 0.522
8 0.4 0.226
9 0.562 0.449
10 0.32 0.202
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Figure 7: NE, QRE, SQRE and experimental data of game 3: the average
strategy profile is in the region of the SQRE of this game and relatively distant
from the NE. Five games out of the ten games exhibit a similar behavior. In
the inset is the payoff matrix of this game.
According to the payoff matrices in Table 1, we obtain the SQRE and the
QRE of ten games and compare the experimental data points with our SQRE.
There are five games (games 2, 3, 6, 7, 9) for which the experimental data points
are in the area of the SQRE. We show one of them in Fig.7 as an example. The
experimental data from three games (games 1, 5, 8) are in the area of unstable
solutions but remain closer to our SQRE than to the NE(Fig.8). As shown in
Fig.9, the experimental data points of the remaining two games (games4, 10)
are closer to the NE than to the SQRE. From these simple and limited compar-
isons, we conclude that the SQRE fits the observed behavior in real experiments
better than the NE (5 + 3 : 2 in favor of the former in this limited compari-
son). However, further examination of the relation between the experimental
data and our SQRE is required to arrive at a more definitive answer. We do
not yet have any qualitative or quantitative criteria of games whose expected
experimental behavior is close to the SQRE. This question will be examined in
future investigations.
7 Conclusion and Discussion
In this manuscript, using the Logit quantal response function form (the Boltz-
mann distribution in statistical physics) to link the choice of strategy to the
corresponding payoff in every step, we construct an iterative Logit quantal re-
sponse dynamic process. Thus, the manuscript can be regarded as a dynamic
version of Logit quantal response equilibrium. Importantly, our dynamic pro-
cess differs from the so-called Logit response dynamics, which generally results
in correlated equilibrium, even for non-cooperative games.
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Figure 8: NE, QRE, SQRE and experimental data of game 8: the average
strategy profile is in the region of unstable solutions but remains closer to the
SQRE than to the NE. Three games out of the ten games exhibit a similar
behavior. In the inset is the payoff matrix of this game.
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Figure 9: NE, QRE, SQRE and experimental data of game 10: the average
strategy profile is closer to the NE than to the SQRE. Two games out of the
ten games exhibit a similar behavior. In the inset is the payoff matrix of this
game.
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It has been shown in [21] that the QRE exists for all of the values of β –
a measure of level of players’ payoff sensitivity – and converges toward NEs
when β → ∞. It has also been demonstrated on some examples and been
taken for sure by some researchers that in fitting experimental data, the QRE
is generally better than the NE because it is free to change the value of β to
improve the fitting [23, 35, 36]. In our manuscript, we demonstrate that this is
not the case: When taking stability into consideration, in principle, the QRE is
no longer always better than the NE. Based on the dynamic process, stable and
unstable QREs are distinguished. We find the following: (1) For games with
a single focal pure NE, there is always one stable QRE that converges toward
the preferred NE when β →∞. (2) For games without any focal pure NEs but
with one unique proper mixed NE, when the payoff sensitivity β is sufficiently
large (β > βc), the QREs lose their stability and become unstable. For certain
games, the QREs are already close to their corresponding NEs before they lose
their stability. Therefore, the difference between stable QREs and NEs is small.
For other games, the difference between stable QREs and NEs is substantially
more pronounced.
The latter case could be used to assess the applicability of the QRE to exper-
iments and real-life observations. Then, we compared the stable and unstable
QREs with experimental data. We found that the experimental observation of
certain games (5 games from our preliminary tests) yields results within the re-
gions of the stable QRE, that in other games (3 games), the experimental data
are located in the unstable regions but remain closer to stable QREs than to
the mixed NEs and that for other games (2 games) the experimental results are
closer to the mixed NEs than to the stable QREs. We also believe that Link-
ing mixed NEs to mixed SQREs improves our understanding of applicability of
mixed NEs.
We have not identified any qualitative or quantitative criteria with which
to classify games from this perspective. Further experimental and theoretical
investigations are required to reach such a conclusion. In section 4, we only
present a proof of the main observed features of our dynamic process for sym-
metric 2× 2 games. In the future, a general discussion of the features and their
proof for N×M games should be undertaken and cross-game experiments when
performed and compared against our SQREs with estimated value of β of a fixed
group of players are of good value to put our concepts of SQREs up to further
eximinations.
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